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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY-ARTICLE 119-
BRITISH EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1970-REFERRAL TO EUROPEAN
COURT OF JUSTICE -APPLICABILITY TO BRITISH PENSION PLAN
AND TO SUCCESSIVE EMPLOYMENT CASES.
Mrs. Susan Worringham and Miss Margaret Humphreys
challenged a contributory pension scheme established by Lloyd's
Bank Ltd. on the grounds that it violated the British Equal Pay
Act of 1970.1 The pension scheme is set forth in the employment
contracts of all clerical workers at the bank and requires all who
are engaged in like work to participate in the plan. The plan dif-
ferentiates between men and women under the age of twenty-five.
Men under twenty-five are required to contribute five percent of
their salaries to the pension scheme; women under twenty-five are
exempt from this requirement but have no equity in the pension
fund if they leave the bank before age twenty-five. The required
five per cent payment by the men is funded by the bank in the
form of a five per cent addition to their annual pay. The women
clerks applied to the Industrial Tribunal for an equality of pay rul-
ing.2 The tribunal did not uphold the claim, but held that this pay-
ment was related to death or retirement under the pension exclu-
sion of the Equal Pay Act of 19701 and was therefore exempt from
' British Equal Pay Act, 1970, C. 41, as originally enacted. (hereinafter cited as the Equal
Pay Act) The pertinent provision states as follows:
1.-(1) The provisions of this section shall have effect with a view to securing that
employers give equal treatment as regards terms and conditions of employment
to men and to women, that is to say that (subject to the provisions of this section
and of section 6 below)
-() for men and women employed on like work the terms and conditions of one
sex are not in any respect less favourable than those of the other, and Wb) for men
and women employed on work rated as equivalent (within the 'meaning of subsec-
tion (5) below) the terms and conditions of one sex are not less favourable than
those of the other in any respect in which the terms and conditions of both are
determined by the rating of their work. ...
Mrs. Worringham and Miss Humphreys apparently brought this action as a test case.
14,000 female employees who contributed the amount of three million pounds are affected
by the Lloyds' pension plan. Worringham v. Lloyds' Bank, Ltd. [1979] ICR 174, 1975 (EAT)
(hereinafter cited as Worringham).
' The Equal Pay Act was originally enacted to exclude any provision relating to death or
retirement.
"(1) ... nor shall that requirement extend to requiring equal treatment as regards
terms and conditions related to retirement, marriage or death or to any provision
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the "equal pay for equal work" standard.' The women clerks ap-
pealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal. Held, reversed. The
payments cannot be deemed to relate to "death or retirement"
under the pension exclusion, and the women clerks are entitled to
equal pay.5
In a second case, Mrs. Wendy Smith brought an action under
the Equal Pay Act involving the equal pay provisions of the Act.'
Mrs. Smith worked for MacArthys, Ltd., a pharmaceutical pro-
ducts dealer, as a manager of the stockroom. She was hired to
replace a Mr. McCullough, who had previously worked as
manager of the stockroom, having left four and one-half months
earlier. MacArthys, Ltd., paid Mrs. Smith fifty pounds a week
compared to Mr. McCullough's salary of sixty pounds a week.
While the duties of the two managers were slightly different, the
Industrial Tribunal found that their work was of equal value. Hav-
ing determined that the difference in pay was due solely to a dif-
ference in sex, the Industrial Tribunal held that Mrs. Smith was
entitled to the same pay as Mr. McCullough under the Equal Pay
made in connection with retirement, marriage or death; and the requirements of
section 3(4) of this Act shall be subject to corresponding restrictions. (2) Any ref-
erence in this section to retirement includes retirement, whether voluntary or
not, on grounds of age, length of service or incapacity."
With the enactment of the Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, C. 65, (hereinafter cited as the Sex
Discrimination Act) the wording of the Equal Pay Act was amended to require "equal ac-
cess" to pension schemes, while leaving the exemption for provisions relating to death and
retirement intact.
(1A) An equality clause and those provisions-(a) shall operate in relation to
terms relating to membership of an occupational pension scheme (within the
meaning of the Social Security Pensions Act 1975) so far as those terms relate to
any matter in respect of which the scheme has to conform with the equal access
requirements of Part IV of that Act; (b) by subject to this, shall not operate in
relation to terms related to death or retirement, or to any provision made in con-
nection with death or retirement."
Worringham v. Lloyd's Bank, Ltd. (unpublished report of the Industrial Tribunal).
Worringham, supra note 2.
Equal Pay Act supra note 1, at § 1 (2) and (3).
§1(2) It shall be a term of the contract under which a woman is employed at an
establishment in Great Britain that she shall be given equal treatment with men
in the same employment, that is to say men employed by her employer or any
associated employer at the same establishment or at establishments in Great Bri-
tain which include that one and at which common terms and conditions of
employments are observed either generally or for employees of the relevant
classes.
§1(3) Where a woman is employed at an establishment in Great Britain otherwise
than under a contract which includes (directly or by reference to a collective
agreement or otherwise) a term satisfying subsection (2) above, the terms and
conditions of her employment shall include an implied term giving effect to that
subsection.
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Act (1970).7 The Employment Appeal Tribunal affirmed the deci-
sion,' and the employer appealed to the Court of Appeal. The ma-
jority of the court felt that the British Equal Pay Act could be in-
terpreted to include only male and female employees who are
working concurrently. However, the justices could not agree on
the application of Article 119 of the Rome Treaty, which applies a
straightforward requirement of equal pay for equal work in Euro-
pean Community nations.' Held, the case was stayed while ques-
tions on the interpretation of Article 119 were referred to the
European Court of Justice.10
Both the claims in these cases were based on the British Equal
Pay Act which was enacted together with the Sex Discrimination
Act of 1975 to implement the equal pay for equal work standards
of Article 119 of the Rome Treaty. The Equal Pay Act (1970) in-
troduced the right to equal pay for women. The Sex Discrimina-
tion Act (1975) supplemented that right through its own new pro-
visions and by amendments to the previous act." Among other
things, the Sex Discrimination Act established the Equal Oppor-
tunities Commission.'2 It amended the Equal Pay Act in two
Smith v. MacArthys Ltd. (unpublished report of the Industrial Tribunal).
8 MacArthys Ltd. v. Smith [1978] ICR 500 (EAT).
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, No. 4300, 298
U.N.T.S. 3.
Article 119
[Equal Pay for Men and Women]
Each Member State shall during the first stage ensure and subsequently main-
tain the application of the principle that men and women should receive equal pay
for equal work.
For the purpose of this Article, "pay" means the ordinary basic or minimum
wage or salary and any other consideration, whether in cash or in kind, which the
worker receives, directly or indirectly, in respect of his employment from his
employer.
Equal pay without discrimination based on sex means:
(a) that pay for the same work at piece rates shall be calculated on the basis of
the same unit of measurement;
(b) that pay for work at time rates shall be the same for the same job.
* MacArthys v. Smith, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 1189, C.A.
* Equal Pay Act, supra at note 1. Sex Discrimination Act, supra at note 3.
12
53.-) There shall be a body of Commissioners named the Equal Opportunities
Commission, consisting of at least eight but not more than fifteen individuals each
appointed by the Secretary of State on a full-time or part-time basis, which shall
have the following duties-
(a) to work towards the elimination of discrimination,
(b) to promote equality of opportunity between men and women gener-
ally, and
(c) to keep under review the working of this Act and the Equal Pay
Act 1970 and, when they are so required by the Secretary of State or
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significant ways. First, the Equal Pay Act provisions concerning
the pension exclusions were amended. 13 Second, the Equal Pay
Act now requires that an employment contract be deemed to in-
clude an equality clause if one is not expressly included."
Numerous decisions by the Employment Appeals Tribunal have
produced useful instruction on the subject of equal pay. 5 While
this body of British law is attributable to Article 119 and its im-
plementing legislation, there is a parallel body of law developing
in the European Court of Justice on Article 119. However, the rul-
ings of the two courts do not appear consistent in some areas, as
underscored by the pension problem in the Worringham case.
otherwise think it necessary, draw up and submit to the Secretary of
State proposals for amending them.
The Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC) is charged with working towards the elimination
of discrimination and enforcement of both the Equal Pay Act and the Sex Discrimination Act.
The Commission may conduct its own formal investigations as well as assist individuals in
bringing their complaints.
Another committee, the Central Arbitration Committee, was established in 1975 by the
Employment Protection Act, 1975, C. 71. with responsibilities similar to those of the EOC,
except in relation to collective agreements. This Committee is to review collective
agreements submitted to it by trade unions, employers, or the Secretary of State.
Employment Protection Act, 1975, C.71
3.-(1) Where a trade dispute exists or is apprehended the Service may, at the
request of one or more parties to the dispute and with the consent of all the par-
ties to the dispute, refer all or any of the matters to which the dispute relates for
settlement to the arbitration of-
(a) one or more persons appointed by the Service for that purpose (not
being an officer or servant of the Service); or
(b) the Central Arbitration Committee constituted under section 10
below.
10.-(1) There shall be a body to be known as the Central Arbitration Commit-
tee, in this Act referred to as the "Committee".
(2) Any reference in any enactment, statutory instrument or other document to
the Industrial Arbitration Board (whether by that or any other name) shall be
construed as a reference to the Committee.
(3) The provisions of Part II and (so far as applicable) Parts I and III of
Schedule 1 to this Act shall have effect with respect to the Committee.
IS See note 3.
Equal Pay Act §1(1), as amended by §8 of the Sex Discrimination Act. "If the terms of
a contract under which a woman is employed at an establishment in Great Britain do not in-
clude (directly or by reference to a collective agreement or otherwise) an equality clause
they shall be deemed to include one."
'" The procedure for bringing individual claims under the Act is to submit these claims
initially to an Industrial Tribunal. The decisions of the Industrial Tribunal are not binding
upon other courts. However, they may be appealed to the Employment Appeals Tribunal
whose decisions do constitute a binding body of law. According to a report prepared for the
EEC, 2493 individual claims regarding equal pay were received by the Industrial Tribunal
during the first two years of its existence (December 29, 1975 to December 31, 1977), while
50 of those were appealed to the Employment Appeals Tribunal. Report of the Commission
to the Council on the Application as at 12 February 1978 (1) of the Principle of Equal Pay
for Men and Women.
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Although the Equal Pay Act provides that an employment con-
tract is deemed to have an equality clause, the area of pensions
was originally exempted. This exemption reflected the desire to
avoid disturbing previously existing contract provisions."
However, ongoing discrimination involving pensions resulted in
the provision in the Sex Discrimination Act (1975) for "equal ac-
cess" to pension schemes for men and women while leaving the
prior pension exclusion in effect. 7 The British Employment Ap-
peals Tribunal has broadly construed this exception. For example,
in Roberts v. Cleveland Area Health Authority,18 the tribunal was
presented with the case of a female hospital worker whose
employer imposed a policy requiring women to retire, generally,
at age sixty while allowing men to work until age sixty-five. The
complainant, who was dismissed when she turned sixty, brought a
claim before the Industrial Tribunal of unlawful discrimination
under the Sex Discrimination Act (1975). The complainant argued
that the exemption in §6(4)1" of the Act, providing for the exemp-
tion of provisions relating to retirement, included only retirement
matters-such as pension arrangements and allowances. The In-
dustrial Tribunal rejected that argument, saying that a provision
fixing the date of retirement is rightfully excluded from coverage
of the Act by §6(4). The Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld that
I Worringham, supra note 2, at 176.
" See note 3.
" Roberts v. Cleveland Area Health Auth., [19781 ICR 370.
" Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 2, at §6(4).
6..-(1) It is unlawful for a person, in relation to employment by him at an
establishment in Great Britain, to discriminate against a woman-
(a) in the arrangements he makes for the purpose of determining who
should be offered that employment, or
(b) in the terms on which he offers her that employment, or
(c by refusing or deliberately omitting to offer her that employment.
(2) It is unlawful for a person, in the case of a woman employed by him at an
establishment in Great Britain, to discriminate against her-
(a) in the way he affords her access to opportunities for promotion, or
services, or by refusing or deliberately omitting to afford her access
to them, or
(b) by dismissing her, or subjecting her to any other detriment
(3) Except in relation to discrimination falling within section 4, subsections (1)
and (2) do not apply to employment-
(a) for the purposes of a private household, or
(b) where the number of persons employed by the employer, added to
the number employed by any associated employers of his, does not
exceed five (disregarding any persons employed for the purposes of a
private household).
(4) § (1)(b) and (2) do not apply to provision in relation to death or retirement.
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decision, stating further that the language in §6(4) should be
broadly construed.0
Another case involved a scheme which provided male
employees of a subsidiary of the British Railways Board with
travel privileges for both themselves and their families after
retirement, while it restricted retired female employees to such
privileges only for themselves." A female employee complained of
a violation of the Sex Discrimination Act (1975), and again the In-
dustrial Tribunal held that her treatment was valid under the ex-
clusion provided for in §6(4).22 The Employment Appeals Tribunal,
however, overturned the decision, stating that here the
discrimination was a present one, even though the effects of the
policy would not be felt until she retired.3 Justice Phillips, who
wrote the decision in both the Cleveland and Garland cases,
restated his position from Cleveland that the language in §6(4)
should be liberally construed. Justice Phillips then proceeded to
further "refine" the definition given to §6(4) in the earlier case,
stating that the §6(4) is directed to ".... those arrangements made,
and all those things which have been done, by employers in order
to make provision for retirement, such as provision for pension."
However, he continued, "There is a recognisable territory of
things which are arranged or done, which do not sensibly come
within that description, albeit the effects of them continue after
employment has ceased. '' 2 The travel benefits fit into this latter
territory.
While Article 119 of the Rome Treaty makes no express exclu-
sion for pension schemes, the question of pensions has been con-
sidered by the European Court of Justice in three separate cases
involving a female Belgian airline hostess.5 The claimant, Miss
Defrenne, worked as an airlines hostess for Sabena Airways. Her
employment contract required female cabin crew members to
2*0 Roberts, supra note 18.
" Garland v. British Rail Engineering, [19781 ICR 495.
n Garland v. British Rail Engineering (unpublished report of the Industrial Tribunal).
Garland, supra at note 21.
2, Id. at 495.
Defrenne v. Belgian State, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 8137.
Defrenne v. Soci~td Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne Sabena [1976] E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 445; Defrenne v. Socit6 Beige de Navigation Aerienne Sabena [1976] Transfer Binder]
COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH( 8346.
Defrenne v. Socit4 Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne Sabena, [1978] COMM. MKT.
REP. (CCH) 1 8500.
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retire at age forty. She brought her first suit in the Conseil d'Etat
of Belgium for the annulment of a Royal Decree which permitted
special application of pension provisions to flight personnel in civil
aviation." In support of her action, the employee argued that the
Royal Decree was a violation of Article 119 of the Rome Treaty.
The Belgian Court referred the case to the European Court of
Justice on the question of whether the pension constituted "con-
sideration" under Article 119 which requires equal pay "and other
consideration" for men and women doing equal work. The Euro-
pean Court ruled that since Article 119 applied to payment and
not to job conditions such as pensions, the Sabena pension scheme
was not a violation of Article 119.7 The European Court thus in-
terpreted Article 119 to include a pension exemption.
Miss Defrenne brought another action before the Tribunal du
Travail in Brussels seeking (1) the difference in her salary and
that of her male counterpart, and (2) the difference in the pensions
and severance pay for male and female employees. The case was
ultimately appealed to the Labor Court in Brussels, which refer-
red the case to the European Court for a ruling on Article 119 and
its applicability to the national law of the member states.28 The
Court ruled that Article 119 may create a cause of action in na-
tional courts regardless of the existence of enacting legislation
there."
In the third action before the Belgian Courts, Miss Defrenne
sought to force Sabena to pay her an additional allowance on ter-
mination of her service as well as compensation for the damage
suffered regarding her pension. 0 The case was appealed to the
Belgian Court of Cassation, which ordered the case referred to the
European Court of Justice to decide the preliminary question of
whether Article 119,applied to conditions of work. Miss Defrenne
argued that Sabena's policy of mandatory retirement had
pecuniary consequences in the form of lesser pension payments
Royal Decree of November 3, 1969 set special rules for the application of the Royal
Decree No. 50 of October 24, 1967, concerning pensions, to flight personnel in civil aviation
(Moniteur Belge of December 10, 1969, pp. 11903-11911).
Defrenne v. Belgian State, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8137.
Rep. (CCH) paragraph 8137.
For a more detailed discussion, see EEC-Direct Application of Community Law-
Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome Requiring Equal Pay for Equal Work Has Direct Effect
Upon National Law of Member States, 7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 195 (1977).
" Case No. 43/75, Defrenne v. Socitd Anonyme Belge de Navigation Aerienne Sabena,
[1976 2 COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8346.
" A mandatory retirement plan was also the subject of the Roberts case, where the
British Court allowed the plan to stand under the Equal Pay Act §6(4) exclusion.
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and therefore was in violation of Article 119. The European Court
did not accept Miss Defrenne's contention, but rather maintained
its previous position that Article 119 dealt exclusively with equal
pay and not to conditions of work even where those conditions had
pecuniary consequences.," The Court of Justice has thus con-
sistently refused to include pension plans within the requirements
of Article 119.2
The exclusion of pension plans from the coverage of Article 119
by the European Court of Justice, as well as the broad interpreta-
tion given to the pension exclusion by the British Courts in earlier
cases, cast the Worringham case in the light of a forward reaching
decision in the area of pensions. The employers in that case
argued, as the European Court had decided in the Defrenne cases,
that Article 119 applies directly, but that pension matters could
be excluded from the coverage of Article 119 by national legisla-
tion. The Employment Appeal Tribunal refused to consider the
case on those grounds, however, stating that it could be decided
through application of British law alone. Through their interpreta-
tion of §6(1A)(b), the court concluded that the pension exclusion
does not cover the activities of Lloyd's Bank.
The Employment Appeals Tribunal interpreted the Equal Pay
Act in a materially different way than did the Industrial Tribunal.
First, the Court chose to look at the five per cent pay variance
from the standpoint of gross payment rather than to view it as
relating to death and retirement which would have brought it
within the pension exclusion. The court so held in spite of prior
decisions that the pension exclusion should be "widely and
generously applied".3 Second, the Industrial Tribunal had decided
that Lloyd's pension plan was allowable under the pension exclu-
sion because the pay difference for men and women was directly
connected to the different pension provisions.' The tribunal ac-
cepted Lloyd's argument that their scheme was intended to be in
accordance with national policy, reflecting different treatment
only where pensions were concerned. The Employment Appeals
Tribunal flatly rejected that argument, however, stating that the
"I Defrenne v. Soci6td Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne Sabena, [1978] E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 1365; Defrenne v. Socit6 Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne Sabena [1978
Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8500.
"2 Much has been written of the Defrenne cases, see McCallum & Smith, EEC Law and
UK Occupational Pension Scheme, 1977 EUROPEAN L. REV. 270.
Crisham, Gabrielle Defrenne v. Societe Anonyme Beige de Navigation Aerienne Sabena, 14
COMM. MKT. L.R. 102.
" Worringham, supra note 2, at 180.
' Worringham, supra note 4.
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law demanded equality in pay, and if there was in fact inequality
in pay, then "extrinsic forces, explanations, good intentions all are
of no avail.3 5
The Employment Appeals Tribunal did take an interest in the
applicability of EEC law, stating that if the Equal Pay Act allowed
an exception to the equal pay for equal work principle, such an ex-
ception was in conflict with Article 119. As for the employer's
argument that the second Defrenne case allows individual nations
to make exceptions to the equal pay principle, the Employment
Appeals Tribunal noted a possible basis of distinction in the
Defrenne finding raised by the employee's counsel. The Defrenne
decision would limit permissible exclusions only to state insurance
provisions translated into contractual arrangements, an arrange-
ment definitely different from Lloyd's plan. Also, the British
Court took considerable notice of an EEC Council Directive,
issued on February 10, 1975, which requires elimination of sex
discrimination with regard to all aspects and conditions of
remuneration., The Employment Appeals Tribunal felt that this
Directive was inconsistent with the Defrenne ruling and would at
least raise the question of the validity of the British pension exclu-
sion under EEC law. However, the Worringham Court did not
resolve the questions concerning Community law, because it be-
lieved that Lloyd's pension plan was invalid under British law
alone.
This narrowing interpretation of the pension exclusion by the
Employment Appeals Tribunal may be significant, especially
when it is considered in conjunction with the referral of the Smith
case to the European Court of Justice. The British Court has been
quite hesitant to refer cases to the European Court of Justice. In-
deed, the Smith case referral was the first time the Court of Ap-
peal had referred a case to the European Court for an opinion on
the construction and application of a Treaty article. In the Smith
case, the majority of the Court of Appeal was willing to validate,
under British law, McCarthys Ltd.'s action of paying Mrs. Smith
less than her male predecessor. The same justices could not reach
a decision on whether to permit MacArthys' action under Com-
munity law. European Community law is directly applicable and
controlling in relation to British law. 7 Rather than take the
" Worringham, supra note 2, at 179.
EEC Council Directive 75/117, issued Feb. 10, 1975; 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 45) 19
(1975).
" In Defrenne v. Sabena, supra at note 28, the European Court ruled that Article 119
was directly applicable to the Nation States. In Shields v. Coombes, 11978] 1 W.L.R. 1408,
the British Court of Appeal ruled on the superiority of EEC law, particularly Article 119.
1980]
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chance of making a decision on the interpretation of Article 119
that would be at odds with European Community law, the Justices
in the Smith case referred the case to the European Court.
A concern for proper application of EEC law has been demon-
strated in other interpretations of the Equal Pay Act by the
British Courts. As was the case in the facts of Smith, many of the
questions which come before the courts arise from instances of
past discrimination. A common example is the practice of "red
circling," a scheme designed for workers who were moved from
higher to lower paying jobs to insure that they kept their prior
salary. Typical of these cases was one involving some machine
parts inspectors. Men and women working together here as in-
spectors were ultimately being paid different salaries, because
most of the male inspectors had been moved from higher paying
jobs in the same factory. Under the "red circling" scheme, these
men were allowed to keep their prior salary, even though their
female counterparts worked for less. The employer argued that
the difference was valid under the Equal Pay Act which absolves
the employer where the pay difference is due to a factor other
than sex." The Court, however, rejected that argument, reasoning
that this was past discrimination taking a present form, and that
to allow the employer to succeed in such an argument would be
contrary to the spirit of the Act. In disallowing the "red circling"
scheme, the Court emphasized that there must be harmony be-
tween the British and EEC laws. 9 This was also the concern in the
Court of Appeals' referral of the Smith case to the European
Court.
Two of the three members of the Court of Appeals believed
that the British Equal Pay Act could not be read to require that
Mrs. Smith receive pay equal to that of Mr. McCullough. Section
Equal Pay Act, supra note 1 at § 6.
(6) Where a woman ought to be or to have been given equal treatment with a
man as required by her equal pay clause, and he enjoys or has enjoyed by com-
parison with her any greater remuneration or other advantage, then it shall be
for the woman's employer to show that this advantage is not the result of his
terms and conditions of employment being in any respect more favourable than
hers, but is genuinely due to a material difference (other than the difference of
sex) between her case and his.
In the words of Mr. Justice Phillips:
It is important to observe that Article 119 establishes a principle, with little or no
detail of the way in which it is to be applied. It appears to us that the Sex
Discrimination Act [1975], and the Equal Pay Act [1970], must be construed and
applied subject to, and so as to give effect to, the principle." Snoxell & Davies v.
Vauxhall Motors, [1977] ICR 700, 715.
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1(2)(a)(i) of the Equal Pay Act (1970) requires equal pay for a
woman who "is employed on work rated as equivalent with that of
a man in the same employment." 0 Lord Justice Lawton and Lord
Justice Cumming-Bruce construed this language, phrased in the
present tense, to apply only to men and women working concur-
rently. On the other hand, Master of the Rolls, Lord Denning, read
that present tense language in conjunction with §1(2)(b)(i) which
requires equal pay "where the woman is employed on work rated
as equivalent with that of a man in the same employment."'" He
reasoned that this sets a standard for equal pay based upon the
value of the work done, regardless of whether the woman is em-
ployed simultaneously or in succession with her male counterpart.
Also, in his construction of §1(2)(a)(i), Lord Denning referred to the
Sex Discrimination Act (1975) §§1, 6(1), and (2)."2 Those sections
0 Equal Pay Act, supra note 1 at § 1(2)(a)(i).
(2) An equality clause is a provision which relates to terms (whether concerned
with pay or not) of a contract under which a woman is employed (the "woman's
contract"), and has the effect that-
(a) where the woman is employed on like work with a man in the same
employment-
(i) if (apart from the equality clause) any term of the woman's contract
is or becomes less favourable to the woman than a term of a similar
kind in the contract under which that man is employed, that term of the
woman's contract shall be treated as so modified as not to be less
favourable, and
I Equal Pay Act, supra note 1 at § 1(2)(b)(i).
() where the woman is employed on work rated as equivalent with that of a man
in the same employment-
(il if (apart from the equality clause) any term of the woman's contract
determined by the rating of the work is or becomes less favourable to
the woman than a term of a similar kind in the contract under which
that man is a similar kind in the contract under which that man is
employed, that term of the woman's contract shall be treated as so
modified as not to be less favourable, and
42 Sex Discrimination Act, supra note 3 at §§ 1 and 2.
1.-(1) A person discriminates against a woman in any circumstances relevant
for the purposes of any provision of this Act if-
(a) on the ground of her sex he treats her less favourably than he treats
or would treat a man, or
(b) he applies to her a requirement or condition which he applies or
would apply equally to a man but-
(i) which is such that the proportion of women who can com-
ply with it is considerably smaller than the proportion of men
who can comply with it, and
(ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of
the sex of the person to whom it is applied, and
(iii) which is to her detriment because she cannot comply
with it.
(2) If a person treats or would treat a man differently according to the
man's marital status, treatment of a woman is for the purposes of subsection (1)(a)
GA. J. INT'L. & COMP. L.
prohibit an employer from discriminating against a woman in
granting benefits, even where a woman is replacing a man who
has left his job. Lord Denning concluded that the Equal Pay Act
required a parallel construction, and therefore could not be read
to apply only to men and women working at the same time. This
interpretation was not accepted by Justices, Lawton and
Cumming-Bruce for the majority, however, because they felt the
language in §1(2)(a)(i) should be strictly construed without
reference to other Acts of Parliament.
In considering this interpretation by the majority, the prior
Employment Appeals Tribunal decision should be noted in which
it was held that a woman hired at the same salary as her male co-
worker in accordance with the Equal Pay Act (1970) does not lose
her entitlement to that higher rate of pay simply because the man
with whom she is compared leaves his job.43 Thus, that Court was
willing to impose the standards of the Equal Pay Act, even though
the employment was not concurrent, where the Act had previously
been applicable. Clearly, though, the majority of the Court of Ap-
peals was not willing to extend this type of application of the Act
to include the Smith situation. Lord Justice Cumming-Bruce
demonstrated his reservations on extending the language of the
Act beyond its present tense construction with an example of an
employer who had to reduce wages, thereby causing a man to
leave the job because he could not work for lower wages. Justice
Cumming-Bruce felt it important that the employer be able to hire
a woman at the new lower salary without the risk of a law suit.
Similarly, Justice Lawton was concerned that a more expansive
interpretation of the Equal Pay Act would reduce an employer's
ability to respond to various economic pressures such as dimin-
ishing profits which in turn would necessitate a shift to lower
salaries for workers in general. Such reservations led the majority
of the Court to believe that Parliament intended for the Act to ap-
ply only to instances of concurrent employment.
The Justices considered at length whether the questions sent to
the European Court should be phrased solely in terms of the facts
to be compared to his treatment of a man having the like marital status.
2.-(1) Section 1, and the provisions of Parts II and III relating to sex
discrimination against women, are to be read as applying equally to the treatment
of men, and for that purpose shall have effect with such modifications as are re-
quisite.
(2) In the application of subsection (1), no account shall be taken of special
treatment afforded to women in connection with pregnancy or childbirth.
Sorbie v. Trust Houses Forte Hotels Ltd., [19771 2 ALL E.R. 155.
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of the Smith case or in broader terms of the interpretation of Arti-
cle 119. The Court noted that a request for a similar referral was
scheduled to be made in the Worringham v. Lloyd's Bank case."
Although the Court left the matter of the actual phrasing of the
questions open, it was generally agreed that the questions should
be phrased for broader interpretation in order to prevent the
necessity for repeated referrals to the European Court.
By referring the case to the European Court, the Justices open
the possibility for an application of Article 119 which conflicts
with their interpretation of the British Act. Lord Denning agreed
with Justice Phillips from the Employment Appeals Tribunal that
Article 119 established a principle of equal pay for equal work,
and to effectuate that principle, Article 119 must be construed to
prohibit discrimination against a woman upon succession to a job
previously held by a man, as well as to men and women working
simultaneously. However, both Justice Lawton and Justice
Cumming-Bruce were unclear about the application and construc-
tion of Article 119. Justice Lawton did not feel that the words of
Article 119 commanded applicability to successive employment,
and Justice Cumming-Bruce felt that Article 119 states merely a
general principle which could be compatible with his narrow inter-
pretation of the Equal Pay Act (1970). All three of the Justices
were in firm agreement on the superiority of Article 119 and EEC
law over British law in the case of a conflict. 5 Thus, the interpre-
tations by the European Court of Article 119 will control the
disposition of the case.
CONCLUSION
The European Court will base its ruling in Smith solely upon
the applicability of Article 119 and whether it can be construed to
apply to cases of successive employment.' Unlike the British
Equal Pay Act, Article 119 is not phrased in the present tense.
Equal .pay is defined in Article 119 as "pay for work at time rates
" Smith transcript, supra note 37 at 22.
The Court of Appeal has not decided the Worringham case, and apparently that Court is
waiting to act until the European Court delivers the requested interpretation regarding the
Smith case.
'a Smith transcript, supra note 37.
The question to be referred to the European Court was tentatively phrased at the
Smith hearing as follows: "Whether the principle of equal pay for equal work contained in
Article 119 of the EEC Treaty and Article 1 of the Directive is confined to men and women
doing equal work at the same time or whether it applies to cases of successive employment
where it is reasonable to make a comparison between the workers concerned."
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shall be the same for the same job." Thus, a fairly narrow applica-
tion of European Community law will entitle Mrs. Smith to pay
equal to that of her male predecessor. Conceivably, the European
Court of Justice will want to limit its extension of equal pay in
these cases of successive employment. One way it could do this is
to tie its ruling to the relatively short interval of four and one-half
months between managers as in the Smith facts. Indeed, the
Court may feel more comfortable with a narrow application of Ar-
ticle 119, in anticipation of problems such as those posed by
Justice Cumming-Bruce in the Smith case.
The Worringham case will most likely not fare as well as the
Smith case in the British Court of Appeal. If the Court of Appeal
does not refer the case to the European Court, and it does not ap-
pear anxious to do so, it may well reverse the Employment Ap-
peal Tribunal's ruling in the case. In the Smith proceedings, Lord
Justice Lawton and Lord Justice Cumming-Bruce insisted upon an
extremely narrow reading of the British Equal Pay Act. This
same conservative approach leads to a broad application of the
pension exclusion so as to allow Lloyds' pension scheme to stand
as not being a violation of the Equal Pay Act. Anticipation of such
an application of British law was voiced by the Counsel for the
employees in Worringham in statements made after the Smith
decision was rendered. He stated that it was because he did not
believe that his clients could win under British law in the Court of
Appeal that he was requesting a referral to the European Court of
Justice."7 Thus, unless the Court of Appeal decides the Worr-
ingham case on European Community law grounds or refers it to
the Court of Justice, the British pension exclusion may continue
to embrace plans such as that of Lloyd's Bank.
Beverly Martin
" Mr. Lester: "Since I am going to concede to your Lordship that in the light of your
Lordships' recent decision I am most unlikely to win under English law in this court, the
only issue for your Lordships is whether to refer and, if so, which questions to refer. It will
be a pure European Community law issue. We will try to agree the facts and we will try to
agree the questions, but we will argue strenuously about whether it should be referred. We
are endeavoring to get the transcript of today's judgement as it will shorten it considerably
to have the benefit of this judgment." Smith transcript, supra note 37, at 25.
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